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CHALLENGES: According to all international surveys of corruption, 
Southeastern Europe is among the most corrupt regions in the 
world. As an unintended consequence of the privatization process 
there emerge new kinds of corruption, although all common forms 
are already thriving. If the region is going to be integrated 
into European structures, it must subdue corruption, 
 
BACKGROUND: Competition is a strange word in the region. It is 
not rife either in the product or in the input markets, and 
competition for positions within firms is practically 
nonexistent.  Therefore, economic actors enjoy substantial rents. 
Since competition cannot be introduced overnight, and 
consequently rents are going to exist for a substantial period of 
time, it can be expected that corruption will persist. In such an 
environment, some methods of privatization proved to be very 
prone to corruption. Privatization method, together with the 
competition level, is a crucial factor for the extent of 
corruption in the post privatization period. 
 
PROBLEM: When the ownership rights are dispersed and capital 
markets are underdeveloped, there is a lax control of management 
structure. Managers can perform their own agenda. On the other 
hand, they are not omnipotent, since there is an effective labor 
union. Both sides realize that mutual help can best further their 
interests. Consequently, they try to corrupt each other, and 
endogenous corruption has been created. It was neither imposed 
from the outside, nor a consequence of deteriorating living 
standards. This practice is the principal cause of high 
corruption rates in the region. Not only that it transfers 
tremendous amounts of wealth and creates economic inefficiencies, 
but it also spreads the notion that common (group) interest must 
prevail over the benefit of the general public. 
 
REMEDIES: Endogenous corruption cannot be eradicated easily. 
Customary anticorruption devices may prove to be ineffective. 
Therefore, a new anti-corruption strategy must be devised for 
this particular pattern. Its key elements are: 
• Fostering competition through foreign and internal economic 
liberalization; 
• Establishing a clear relationship between principal and 
agent through the privatization process; 
• Developing commercial law that limits inside-dealing, 
conflict of interest, and protects minority shareholders; 
• Exposing vested interests in a public relations initiative; 




I. New Patterns of Corruption  
 
According to all international surveys of corruption, Southeastern Europe is among the most 
corrupt regions in the world. Daily reports of diverted western aid, money laundering, and 
trade in drugs, tobacco, arms and immigrants, tend to swarm the media. Privatized companies 
do not pay dividends to their shareholders, and restructuring of big industrial plants is 
practically negligent. Lenders cannot recover their borrowed money. Usually, they even do 
not try to receive their due compensation through the slow and corrupted judicial system, but 
instead try to enforce the deal by illegal means. At the same time new forms of corruption 
emerge, mainly in the post-privatization period. By and large, the circumstances make 
foreign investors reluctant to invest in the region, yet these countries desperately need 
additional investments, at least to relieve the exceptionally high unemployment rates.  
 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the international community places anti-corruption policies 
on top of its agenda. The most recent example is the Stability Pact offered by the European 
Union to the region, which has dedicated a substantial effort to combating corruption. All 
countries interested in the association, and eventually joining the European Union, must 
devise anti-corruption policies. These policies have to be designed for a long-lasting period, 
and also tailored to the specific forms of corruption. In other words, since corruption is a 
complex phenomenon, it must be unbundled and each form of corruption must have an 
appropriate antidote. 
 
This paper advocates a policy against the new forms of corruption developed in the post-
privatization period. Anti-corruption strategy is based on the model of emerging industrial 
relations in post communist countries (see the research paper). The proposed course of action 
will suggest certain public policies in order to enhance economic efficiency, and to diminish 
welfare loss due to corruption, and it will turn out to be at odds with classical anti-corruption 
approach. 
 
II. Corruption and Economic Rents 
 
Since Adam Smith it is generally believed that competition lowers rents from economic 
activities. In the perfect competition there are no rents since each actor receives revenue 
equal to costs borne by maintaining the economic activity. Consequently bribes are hard to 
sustain where perfect competition prevails. If, let say, some producers try to include slush 
funds into their cost function, there certainly will be other producers eager to sell goods 
cheaper by not paying bribes.  
 
In general, lower rents reduce not only supply, but also demand for corrupt payments (lower 
level of extortion). Motive of officeholders to seize part of rents by means of extortion is 
lowered since they become aware of low profits in the industry and higher risks of exposure. 
Namely, with diminishing profits bribers will be more willing to expose bribees – they may 
lose less in profits than they gain in reputation of being honest market competitors. 
Moreover, since diminishing rents make high kickbacks unsustainable, rent seekers (who are 
on the supply side of corruption) are willing to pay fewer bribes. Consequently, the level of 
corruption is lowered, as both supply and demand of slush funds diminish.  
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If, however, competition falters, firms will enjoy higher rents, and both enterprises and 
bureaucrats who exert control rights over them (taxes, licenses, or regulations), have higher 
incentives to engage in malfeasant behavior. However, in a democratic society there are some 
opposing forces: high rents may also imply that the public would be keener to control both 
the bureaucracy and potential bribers, so the level of corruption may go down. The public in 
some countries is ready to spend large resources for that purpose and the effects do not miss. 
In spite of that, there seems to be a clear empirical finding that economic rents foster 
corruption. 
 
Having in mind these simple facts, one might conclude that policies of privatization and 
competition are vital clues to the issue of corruption in emerging market economies.  
 
III. Privatization of uncompetitive industries and corruption 
 
In general terms there is a lack of competition in the ex-communist world. The competition is 
not rife either in the product or in the input markets, and competition for positions within the 
firm is practically nonexistent.  Therefore, economic actors enjoy substantial rents. Since 
competition cannot be introduced overnight, rents are going to exist for a substantial period 
of time.  
 
Moreover, as a consequence of either voucher or insider privatization schemes, the new 
governance structures in privatized firms are not strictly controlled either by the owners, or 
by the state. The owners cannot exert their influence when the ownership is dispersed or 
concentrated among the persons dependent on the management. Even if they can – i.e. 
dispersed external owners can concentrate their shares in one or two investment funds - it is 
very hard to replace incumbent management structure owing to the general lack of competent 
managers. Therefore, decentralized voucher, or insider privatization scheme, can result in 
dominant position of managers, although they have on the average only 3-7% of shares. 
Consequently, they can have a substantial leverage in dealings not only within the firm, but 
equally in their daily conduct with government bureaucrats. They are not only in position, but 
also willing to use all available means, including corruption, to further their interests. 
 
In addition, bad management can easily replace good management in privatized companies. 
Privatized firms always have greater value to dishonest then to credible manager, since the 
first can use illegal means to collect debts, or he may pay bribes to regulators in order to 
obtain a privileged position. Therefore, fraudulent manager will use all accessible means to 
secure his position, or to acquire a new promising foothold, with an obvious objective to milk 
the firm’s funds for his personal gain.  
 
On the other hand, emerging market economies have weak and deficient legislation 
concerning such issues as conflict of interest, insider self-dealing, minority shareholder 
protection, or regulatory policies in general. The practicable way to keep managers in check 
is through the state dominated banking system, or by some extra-market forces. However, 
both ways are notorious of their immense opportunities for corruption and more importantly 
– state muddling with the market process. Reformers in many countries shun at their 
imposition. Therefore, management power in post-socialist countries mainly rests unopposed.  
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As we could have expected from the decentralized models of privatization, high rents in 
privatized industries are the principal source of corrupt practices. Both unaccountability of 
the management as a consequence of weak capital markets, and underdeveloped regulatory 
system, bring forth all sufficient conditions for flourishing corruption.  
 
Yet, some other methods of privatization produce quite different ownership structure, and 
consequently offer fewer opportunities for corruption. For example, sale can result in 
concentrated ownership in hands of one (few) strategic investor(s). If they are, at the same 
time respectable foreign firms, they are unlikely to be involved in corruption practices.  
 
By and large, some methods of privatization are more prone to corruption, particularly 
decentralized mass privatization, while others with dominant outside investors are less 
corruption ripe. We may make a conclusion that the privatization method together with 
competition level is a crucial factor for the extent of corruption in the post privatization 
period.  
 
This is a very general statement that adds little to our ability to devise effective anticorruption 
policies. Since corruption can take very diverse shapes, one has to unpack it. In other words, 
one has to have more information on its concrete form in order to work out operative 
anticorruption strategy. Some classical forms of corruption can be remedied with known 
medicines, but new forms must be investigated by focusing on the “black box” (privatized 
firm), in order to discern different vested interests in the post-privatization environment. 
 
IV. Restructuring and emerging industrial relations 
 
A new power base has been created in privatized companies. The lax control of management 
structure has created a powerful force that has to be respected. On the other hand, managers 
are not omnipotent. As we have already pointed out, they usually have just a tiny minority of 
shares. Practical consequence is that some effective coalition of outsiders/insiders might 
jeopardize their position. As skillful players, they will take precautionary steps, which 
include further dilution of shares, special bonuses for big shareholders, pressure on restive 
laborers/shareholders, including a threat to their jobs and positions within the firm. In lawless 
countries they may even threat personal security of designated potential annoyers.  
 
The labor force may try to improve its position in the post-privatization process by creating 
an influential workers' syndicate. The incentives for that are high, since the privatized firms 
are likely to be restructured, which in practice means a loss of jobs for all virtually employed. 
Outside expertise and outside ownership are usually indifferent to the faith of the existing 
labor force. Therefore, strong resistance of some, or most employees, should be expected. For 
them benefits from restructuring may seem quite misty and remote, losses being obvious and 
immediate.  
 
On the other hand, obstacles for creation of an effective labor union are also great. The 
management may thwart labor efforts, fearing that strong union might endanger their 
position. The endeavor can be also ruined by personal ambitions of would-be-leaders. Their 
personal antagonism may steer the creation of several competing labor unions in the firm. 
Proficient managers can channel labor demands by giving selective offers and counteroffers 
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to different labor representatives. However, it is not in the management interest to nullify 
labor power, since it can potentially give them support against outsiders. Having in mind just 
that outside threat, the managers will persist on having no more than one labor union in the 
firm. It is much easier to influence one labor leadership than several.  
 
V. Endogenous corruption  
 
Once settled, the labor union in a privatized company can further its interests. Members of 
the union prefer job security to higher wages and salaries. If they are at the same time inside 
shareholders, they will expect some dividends, but surely enough, retaining jobs is their 
primary concern. Union leadership must respect medium voter preferences, and therefore it 
will select one or mixture of the following strategies:  
• Try to sway managers pointing to deteriorating living standard and uncertain position 
of labor the force in privatized company. However, begging is seldom a useful 
strategy. 
• Threaten with strike, which would send a warning to shareholders, but also dissuade 
potential outside investors from investing in the firm. This strategy can be powerful, 
but also risky. By pursuing it, labor union can easily shoot into its own leg – the lack 
of new investments can lead to further contraction in production, and consequently to 
the loss of jobs. 
• Make a coalition with outside owners in order to topple present management. 
However, outsiders are mainly interested in obtaining profit. Once in charge, they 
will restructure the firm and fire all those virtually employed. Therefore, this strategy 
is counterproductive in the long run. 
• Offer a deal (bribe) to the manager, in order to accept inefficient scale of 
employment. Wasteful employment and bribes can be financed through further 
exploitation of the market power. This strategy proves to be dominant. 
 
Since managers' position is also precarious, they have to take a counter-move. Their primary 
interest is to retain control over the firm. That is the only way to keep on milking somebody 
else’s resources, which is practically the principal way for making private capital. Only 
secondly they are interested in gaining the reputation of a tough bargainer (efficient 
manager). Their most likely options are:  
• Try a crackdown on labor union, or intimidate their leaders. The strategy might be 
efficient, but somewhat risky. It can bolster workers’ resistance and ruin firm’s public 
image. Outside owners will certainly react, at least by selling their shares, with 
consequent drop in share prices. 
• Accept nominally all employees’ demands for job security, and try to shift the final 
showdown as far as possible in the future. In the meantime the management has to 
sway union leadership, or organize a substantial opposition that would undermine 
their position. 
• Fully defend previous employment policies. That could bring a temporary relief 
(easing tensions with labor), but in the log run the strategy would be the losing one. 
Certainly it will not raise firm’s profits, and outside owners would either organize a 
coalition in order to replace managers, or they would sell their shares. Both reactions 
are unfavorable to the management – they either lose job, or reputation.  
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• Accept union’s offer and cooperate with it on the employment issue. The outsiders 
have to be constantly persuaded that the firm is restructuring slowly in order to keep 
good industrial relations, and that profits are round the corner. This strategy easily 
dominates the others. 
 
The third set of actors in this game are the outside owners. They are mainly interested in 
obtaining a capital gain (difference between buying and selling price), and only secondly they 
are interested in dividends, or acquiring control over production. Anyway, their set of options 
is very limited. They can either sell the shares if the things turn sour, and very likely lose the 
money since capital market is very limited and potential investors do not expect improvement 
in firm’s profitability, or try to organize a coalition against the management, which is tedious 
and uncertain. With first signs of bad industrial relations within the firm they will probably 
try to replace the management. We have already seen that the task is not an easy one. They 
will have to organize a coalition, comprising small investors who own dispersed ownership 
claims. They may even try to include inside owners who dare to oppose the management. 
However, their objective is quite clear to everyone – they want to improve x-efficiency of the 
firm in order to raise its value. Therefore employees/owners are aware that by supporting 
outside owners they are nearer to the restructuring, which might have a considerable 
unfavorable trade-off (loss of job in order to obtain a small dividend). Obviously, it is not in 
their interest to support outsiders, so the latter must count on their own. 
 
As we can see, both managers and employees realize that the only winning strategy is mutual 
cooperation. The only force that can protect managers from outside owners is a strong 
workers' union. So their immediate interest is to organize workers and control their might 
through corrupt officials. Therefore, they will bribe workers' leaders in order to develop and 
maintain a credible protection force. They may supply them with plush offices and firm’s car 
with a driver, arrange free meals in expensive restaurants, and pay for their family vacations. 
All these expenses can be included in firm’s costs, since there is no real competition in the 
industry. Therefore, costs are raised in comparison to the competitive level and they can 
remain so high. At the end of the year, books show no profit, and therefore no dividends are 
disbursed. Clearly, outside owners are the principal losers of this game, but buyers also pay 
higher prices and consequently lose a part of the consumers’ surplus. 
 
Employees find their interest in supporting these policies. They will maintain their positions 
in the firm, and receive wages and salaries, which, however low, are still higher than the lost 
dividend (if they have some ownership claims in the firm). They will vote for union leaders 
who deliver job security, although they are aware of special liaison between union leaders 
and the management.  
 
Union leaders are obviously better off with these policies. They can lead relatively luxurious 
lives, having a strong backing in their power base, with only moral costs of turning a blind 
eye to management’s misconduct. However, they are aware that their and management’s 
perks are part of firm’s profits, and also witness other malfeasant behavior by managers, i.e. 
their appropriation of firm’s rents. The varying degree of corruption is needed for union 
leaders to participate in this game, but some would be willing to accept even a stagnant or 
deteriorating material position of their power base in order to improve their personal gain. 
Clearly, the principal sources of mutual bribes are rents associated with the market power of 
the firm.  
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We may call this process the ENDOGENOUS CORRUPTION. It is endogenous as a 
consequence of systemic changes in the ownership structure. It was neither imposed from 
some outside (for example cultural) factor, nor a consequence of deteriorating living 
standard. It is simply a built-in mechanism whose forces are unleashed with the termination 
of state and communist party control, and general failure to create an effective outside 
ownership. It is highly spread across many post-communist countries, whenever the new 
governance structure of privatized firms is not in hands of one dominant (strategic) investor. 
We find this practice as the principal cause of high corruption rates in the region. Not only 
that it transfers tremendous amounts of wealth, but it also spreads the notion that common 
(group) interest must prevail over the benefit of the general public. 
 
Some forms of corruption, specifically in an over-regulated environment, can be beneficial. 
They can supply “grease for the squeaking wheels of a rigid administration”. But endogenous 
corruption is clearly harmful. In that game corrupt managers and union leaders win, and 
employees retain their jobs, which they value the most. Even employees/shareholders are 
better off, since they prefer job security to small dividend claims. The only real losers are 
outsiders – owners who do not receive dividends and consumers who pay higher prices for 
products and services of corrupt industries. It can be shown that their combined loss is always 
greater than the gain of better off parties (see the Research Paper).  
 
VI.  Typology of endogenous corruption 
 
The social loss due to endogenous corruption critically depends on the elasticity of 
demand. In the unlikely case of perfect competition i.e. infinite elasticity of demand, 
there is no opportunity for raising prices above competitive costs. Therefore, no rents 
exist, and both supply and demand for corrupt payments reduce to zero. As price 
elasticity falls, a split between price and marginal revenue emerges, and optimizing 
producers find their equilibrium by equating marginal costs with marginal revenues. 
Consequently, price is above cost, some actors receive rents, and an opportunity for 
endogenous corruption has been created. As marginal costs cannot be negative, marginal 
revenue must be also nonnegative, which practically means elasticity of demand equal to, 
or greater than one. In the former case (elasticity equal to one) - although an extreme case 
(zero marginal cost) – the most favorable condition for endogenous corruption has been 
defined. 
 
The other critical element that must be taken into consideration is the ownership 
structure. It can be inside dominated, or outside dominated, and in both cases either 
dispersed or concentrated. The most favorable case for endogenous corruption is insider 
dominated dispersed ownership structure (employee ownership). The next favorable 
environment is insider concentrated (managers and employees), and finally follows 
outside dispersed (voucher scheme). Outside concentrated ownership creates very few 
opportunities for endogenous corruption. We can summarize these findings in a following 
table (Table 1). 
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Table 1. Typology o Endogenous Corruption 
Elasticity of Demand 
 Low (higher 
than one) 
High Infinite 
Concentrated + +- 0 Inside 
dominated Dispersed ++ + 0 








dominated Dispersed + - 0 
Note 




VI. Policy alternatives 
 
Endogenous corruption cements the coalition of interests within firm against outside 
investors. The vested interests are financially supported by rents collected in an 
uncompetitive market, and a new climate favorable for corruption has been created.  
Managers corrupt union leaders, who turn their blind eye to diversion of capital's income into 
managers' pockets.  Union members are happy to retain their jobs and their social benefits 
(health and pension insurances, transportation and lunch allowances), and consequently do 
not want to rock the boat.  Not unexpectedly, privatized firms with dominant insider 
ownership usually pay no dividends to outside investors.  
 
From the social point of view it is immaterial which way the payment goes, since endogenous 
corruption is a kind of redistribution of rents. The social interest must be focused on 
allocative efficiency losses that are substantial in the arrangement. Since the gains to insiders 
are highly concentrated, and the welfare loss is disseminated among many consumers and 
small investors, the deal reached within the privatized firm will remain unopposed. This fact 
is in concert with economic thinking, according to which large groups composed of rational 
individuals will not act in their group interests (Olson’s paradox). 
 
Endogenous corruption cannot be eradicated easily. One might add that it can be unearthed 
even more painfully than regular forms of corruption. Customary anticorruption devices 
usually cannot tackle the endogenous corruption. For example, a common anticorruption 
strategy is development of an independent civil sector, typically in the form of non-
governmental organizations. But partly out of misapprehension, partly out of prejudices, 
watchdogs of public interest in the post-communist society may find the announced deal 
between management and union leaders praiseworthy, since it preserves jobs against the 
selfish interests of "outside greedy shareholders". 
 
Therefore, a comprehensive policy against endogenous corruption must be designed 
carefully. Since absence of such a policy is also an option, we will start with the analysis of 




a) Doing nothing 
 
One may conclude that the endogenous corruption is limited in scope, and also concentrated 
in big industrial plants that are inefficient in any way. With continual process of capital 
milking (“tunneling”), managers will at a certain point become either capable of organizing 
production in their private enterprises, or become rich enough to buy-out. In both cases they 
will show enough material interest in organizing economically efficient firms. This rationale 
may be used as an excuse not to devise any active policy against endogenous corruption. A 
cynical remark might be added that previous reasoning is especially exacerbated in the 
situation when managers of privatized firms support politicians that are currently in power 
(though smart managers finance both the government and the opposition politicians). 
 
Although there may not be adopted any explicit policy toward endogenous corruption, some 
other policies exert a substantial influence on its level. Therefore, they must be included as 
variants of this policy option. The most highly profiled and most popular in the region are the 
following: 
- Industry protection. Privatized firms are clearly inefficient. They cannot bear 
foreign competition. Therefore, in order to reduce the trade deficit, the 
government imposes export subsidies, import duties, and/or additional barrier 
to entry. The policy raises firm’s rents, which can virtually satisfy all vested 
interests – managers accrue more income, labor retain jobs and receive higher 
remuneration, even outside owners receive some dividends. The only losers 
are consumers who pay more dearly for goods and services, and most likely 
pay higher taxes. The policy usually runs unopposed due to Olson’s paradox. 
- Suspension of managers’ rights. If the public opinion strongly opposes 
enrichment of the managerial class (it rarely opposes industry protection, 
since it is good for “national interests” – whatever it may mean), the 
government may introduce new rules of conduct. For example, an ex-
manager of privatized company cannot open his own business for a certain 
period; even his relatives cannot open business in the same industry etc. Some 
countries also introduce retroactive taxation and/or additional property taxes. 
In all these variants managers have less incentives to participate in corrupt 
activities, although it is not for granted that the outsiders will be better off. 
- Boosting inflation. All transition economies have great problems with 
government finances. Substantial deficits are inflationary financed. Although 
government’s primary goal is to cover the gap between expenditure and 
revenue, not to give an additional impetus to managerial diversion of 
resources, in practice this policy promotes corruption. Inflation allows 
monopolies to raise prices above the average inflation rate, although cost 
borne by monopolies may not follow the same pattern. Also, capital 
depreciation is not calculated in real terms, which creates windfall profits for 
monopolies only due to inadequate accounting standards. As we have 
witnessed, larger rents (profits) allow higher corruption rate in general, and 
endogenous corruption in particular. 
 
 12 
Adverse consequences of inactive policy toward endogenous corruption may be mainly 
located in the realm of macroeconomic efficiency losses. Privatized firms falter, since their 
already low physical productivity is coupled with rising costs. This translates directly into 
deteriorating terms of trade, loss of foreign markets, and increase in the trade deficit. Export 
can be maintained only trough heavy subsidies, which place a new burden on the already 
exhausted economy. Surplus labor in privatized companies and delayed restructuring are not 
attractive for potential foreign investors, therefore there is a lack of foreign direct investment. 
“Greenfield investment” is also slack due to barriers to entry. Dying down of privatized 
companies and creation of several small units may mean loss of economies of scale and 
scope, with further degradation of comparative advantages in the international trade. 
 
 
b) New legislation 
 
The usual way to make an impact on the processes in post-communist societies is through the 
legislative activities. A plethora of new laws has been created each day. It costs very little to 
pass a new law and there is already overstaffed administration eager to implement new 
regulations. However, the benefits are also low, since a tremendous pile of (often conflicting) 
legislation, incite citizens not to obey to the law. That creates further degradation of the rule 
of law. 
 
Anyhow, if there is substantial pressure from the public opinion do take some steps against 
corruption, a new law can be crafted, with special provisions against endogenous corruption. 
That will bring very few effects, since in most cases corruption goes unreported and both 
sides have incentives not to reveal the deal. 
 
Instead of fighting consequences, it is more effective to search for causes of endogenous 
corruption, and counter them with new legislation. The new laws and rulings are necessary in 
the following areas: 
• Privatization law. If the privatization process has not been completed yet, new 
provisions must be brought in order to stimulate outside concentrated ownership, 
preferable by strategic investors. If the same law regulates investment funds, new 
provisions must be made in order to concentrate ownership claims (maximal 
percentage of shares held by an investment fund has to be lifted). 
• Commercial law. Governance of the joint stock companies must be carefully crafted, 
with special provisions for protection of minority rights, rules of representation at the 
shareholders’ meetings, prohibition of inside dealings, conflict of interest prevention, 
debt-equity easement and stimulation. 
• Labor law. Provisions concerning unionization and labor representation must be 
thoroughly examined. Setup of new labor unions must be eased, their competition 
stimulated, with precise rules of representation during negotiations with the 
management. Labor participation in firm’s governing bodies must be abandoned 
since in practice it represents an invitation for corruption. 
• Anti-trust law. All barriers to entry must be removed and free access to all industries 
granted. Natural monopolies have to be regulated in a transparent way, by 
establishing state and local regulatory commissions (their rule of conduct must be 
prescribed in advance). 
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• Freedom of information act. Since mafia-type activities are highly disseminated in 
the region, the law must protect supply and demand of information. Exposure of 
secret deals must be stimulated, journalists protected, as well as their sources of 
information. 
 
These substantial changes in the rule of the game may be accompanied with some pro-active 
policies that can be taken as variants of the same legislative approach. The most effective are 
the following: 
- Clean hands policy. The government must delegate into state firm’s 
governing body persons with impeccable past. That will be a positive 
incentive to all soundly led companies to hire similar persons in their 
respective corporate governance boards. It can be also stipulated that certain 
number of the supervisory board members come from professionals, 
academics, or some other highly appreciated positions. 
- Anti-corruption council. The government may establish a council of experts 
(lawyers, economists, honorable politicians, journalists, academicians, 
representatives of non-governmental organizations dealing with corruption) 
as an advisory body to the Cabinet. The council will organize public inquires, 
debates, hearings, issue statements, and advise new legislation and measures 
against corruption. 
- Media and civil society support. The government may have as a persistent 
policy support for the independent media and parts of the civil society 
interested in combating corruption. Support may range from material help to 
giving special tips, or easier access to the information. 
 
If this policy option is implemented consistently, together with some (or all) of its variants, it 
can deliver substantial improvement in few years time. However, one must have in mind that 
even some countries that have a long tradition of the rule of law have not solved even the 
classical corruption problem. The illustrative example is Italy, which could not have solved 
major corruption scandals even after twenty years of public inquiry. The situation there is 
much better than it used to be, but still the country is far from the Nordic standards of low 
corruption. In the ex-communist countries the rule of law concept is still at an early stage, 
and new forms of corruption emerge along with the classical. Therefore, expected outcomes 
of this policy option must be even more modest than in developed countries.  
 
 
c) Public relation initiative 
 
If the government has limited expectations from the legislative attack on corruption, it can 
opt for some kind of public campaign against corruption. The government may pursue with 
public relation initiative, stressing that now, after the democratic change, everything depends 
on individual grapple with the problem. Since the laws are cumbersome and nobody abides to 
the law, the struggle against corruption critically depends on individual and local ingenuity.  
 
This policy option may have the next elements: 
• Media campaign against corruption. The public opinion in the communist period 
had been indoctrinated in favor of egalitarianism. That view was supported by the 
false Marxian labor theory of value, according to which remuneration has to be 
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subject to labor exerted in the production process. Therefore, if somebody’s income 
is not commensurable to the labor exerted, it must be unearned (result of 
exploitation). Although the whole construct is false, long lasting indoctrination 
created a widespread acceptance. The government can exploit that sentiment and 
organize a strong campaign against corruption. The main accent may be on 
inequality created by corrupt practices. There is even some room for struggle against 
endogenous corruption, since employees already having their jobs are considered in 
the present situation of high unemployment as privileged. If their wages and salaries 
are at the same time exposed (much higher than in the rest of the economy, owing to 
the distribution of rents), the public sentiment will certainly turn against corrupt 
deals. 
• Media campaign against monopolistic practices. Campaign may be led not only 
against corrupt deals, but also more broadly against all monopolistic practices. 
Therefore, this can be considered as a variant of the previous approach. However, a 
general struggle against monopolies will not be as accepted as the struggle against 
inequality, since the public accepts the biggest monopolistic firms as “family silver” 
– for the long time greatest employers in their respective regions, but also largest 
exporters and suppliers of some public goods. Also, it will be hard to elucidate the 
necessity to have competition on the labor market, to have several labor unions, and 
to explain harmful effects of labor participation in the firm’s management.   
• Public exposure of corrupt deals and officials implicated. It will be relatively 
easy to get a public approval for the exposure of some corrupt government official. 
The overwhelming evidence of high living standards can be a substitute for definite 
proof of wrongdoing. The same is true for employees who receive wages and salaries 
substantially higher than the medium income. It will be, however, much trickier to 
explain that some employees retain their jobs only owing to endogenous corruption, 
although their monthly remuneration hardly covers existence level, i.e. that they 
should lose their jobs and positions despite their subsistence wages. If there are very 
few opportunities for alternative employment, the task seems almost impracticable.   
 
Public campaign may demand a lot of time and resources, which are anyway scarce. The 
success is not warranted, and sometimes the result may be unexpected. Sometimes it can be a 
two-blades sword: public sentiment may turn against each entrepreneurial activity, or may 




d) Liberalization policy 
 
Since the combined gain to insiders is always less than the loss to outsiders, endogenous 
corruption diminishes social welfare. Moreover, it has devastating allocation effects. Through 
commodity interconnectedness it reduces profits in other industries and creates substantial 
efficiency losses. Its perseverance, however, crucially depends on the extent of market 
competition. With rising elasticity of demand for firm's products, there will be constantly less 
means for corruptive behavior. Conventional wisdom states that it is always useful to have 
strong competition on product and factor markets, but such recommendation is especially 
justified in situations where endogenous corruption is rife. Therefore, one additional 
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argument in favor of an active competition policy has been created, and that is another policy 
option - strong orientation toward economic liberalization.  
 
The liberalization policy must have two different tracks:  
• Foreign liberalization, i.e. opening up of domestic markets to foreign competition 
by:  
- Simplifying foreign trade dealings (abandonment of import quotas, 
licenses, easier access to domestic market, etc.);  
- Lowering custom duties and taxes; 
– Credible exchange-rate policy, 
– Simplifying procedures for foreign direct investment, 
– No limits on profit repatriation.  
 
• Internal liberalization  
– Simplifying procedures for starting new businesses, which have to be 
rule-based, streamlined and transparent;  
– Developing effective bankruptcy procedures; 
– Reform of the tax collection system;  
– Lowering the levies;  
– Creation of legal and enforcement mechanisms for penalizing anti-
competitive behavior, etc. 
 
The main objective of this policy option is to create an open economy completely integrated 
into the global trade. Therefore, economic system must be completely commensurable to the 
rest of the world economy. In order to achieve that goal, additional systemic changes must be 
introduced: 
- General accounting principles (GAP). Socialist governments 
had introduced accounting rules with the primary goal to control 
material flows. Only sporadically some countries have moved 
toward a market system of financial control. However, in the last 
ten years some advanced reformers made a substantial move 
accepting European Accounting Standards. Since the EU is the 
main economic partner, this policy proved right, but having in 
mind globalization trends, it is advisable to make a system fully 
matching the American standard practices (GAP). 
- Financial markets. All obstacles to a free trade in shares, 
debentures, options, futures, and all other financial instruments, 
must be lifted. However, financial markets are still in the 
emerging stage. For the long period they will remain very 
shallow, and their ability to collect greater amounts of money will 
remain limited. Therefore, there is no need for each country to 
develop its own stock exchange, which means that it can use 
facilities in the neighboring countries. If, for example, the 
Budapest Stock Exchange is more advanced, there is no need to 
develop a domestic stock exchange. Of course, the most attractive 
firms should try to enter even bigger trade centers. If, however, 
the government decides to support domestic Stock Exchange, the 
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adopted rules must be harmonized with rules prevalent at the 
global market. 
- Currency. Some regional countries will be accepted as new 
members of the European Union in the first wave. Others are in 
accession or association processes, with an equal prospect to be 
included in the European Monetary Union (Euro Zone). 
Therefore, it is a necessity for all countries in the region to 
facilitate trade in euros. If a country does not meet standards for 
the inclusion in the European Monetary System, it may consider 
eurization – acceptance of euro for domestic currency. Smaller 
economies can easily adopt European currency, since population 
already uses it for bigger transactions and for saving purposes. 
Larger economies could experience troubles with abandoning 
domestic currency, so if costs outweigh benefits, change to euro 
could be postponed. In the meantime, stable monetary policy is 
essential, which can be achieved by using the currency board. 
- Competition policy. This is an essential part of the liberalization 
endeavor and, as such, it has been already emphasized. Here we 
may only add that it has to be completely in accordance with 
North American and European standards. 
 
All these measures cannot be introduced overnight. However, simplified procedures for 
starting new businesses and relieve of the tax burden can be quickly accomplished, and the 
main positive effects can be expected in a half year period. This is, of course, subject to the 
political stability and confidence of investors in government reliability. Foreign liberalization 
will create trade deficits that may be substantial in the first two years of the policy 
implementation, but export will grow with the restructuring of domestic economy, and in the 
medium range period the balance of foreign trade will be accomplished. However, 
restructuring of domestic firms will initially increase the unemployment rate, which can 
create substantial political problems. It is, therefore, an absolute priority to start with 
simplifying procedures for business start up, in order to absorb surplus labor. From the point 
of view of endogenous corruption, this policy option is absolutely dominant comparing with 
the other alternatives. It can be expected that the endogenous corruption will die down in few 
years period. 
 
VII. Proposed strategy 
 
It is to be expected that liberalization policy will be opposed by a concert of vested interests 
and misapprehension by the general public. There will be two hostile tendencies: one based 
purely on ideological grounds, and the other founded on vested interests. Some people are 
against foreign goods in principle, since they “ruin” domestic production, and the others are 
against all measures that might be harmful toward laboring classes. The first orientation is 
particularly present in ex-communist countries that promote nationalistic feelings, and the 
other is widespread in countries where the official communist propaganda had promulgated 
some version of worker self-governance myth (successor countries of ex-Yugoslavia, Poland, 
USSR). Of course, vested interests will create more problems. Labor unions have a 
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a) Vested interests must be identified and exposed 
  
Vested interests can create serious problems in countries that have not replaced management 
structure after the collapse of the communist regime. Managers used to be members of the 
nomenklatura, which had a long tradition of good relationships with top politicians, not 
infrequently with opposition leaders. Once the opposition took over, they retained the 
privileged position. In some countries they are so powerful that the government always 
reconsider what the managers’ reaction to a certain measure will be.  
 
Potentially a more serious threat comes from the formerly independent unions. Their leaders 
come from the same circle as most prominent political leaders of the post-communism, and 
they have mutually developed an “old buddies” relationship over time. Therefore, politicians 
are reluctant to take up steps to limit union’s role in privatized firms. That fact is readily 
accepted by union leaders, who often try to establish themselves as inescapable power 
brokers. Their distinguished position vis-à-vis firm’s management is a prelude to the 
endogenous corruption. 
 
b) Public relations initiative is necessary 
 
It is therefore necessary to explain to the general public that insider deals may benefit some, 
but social costs can be truly high. Of course, such a campaign can have only a limited impact, 
but it is useful to remind people that well-being of a certain company and persons employed 
there need not be good for consumers. The remainder might sound quite strange to some who 
were protractedly exposed to the communist indoctrination, which glorified production as the 
focus of interest. A new orientation is needed in many post-communist countries, from 
production centered, seller’s market, to consumer friendly, buyer’s market. This task seems 
of gigantic proportions, but one must have in mind that after each major political turn, such 
as revolution, foreign invasion, or fall of a dictatorial regime, the general public is willing to 
accept a change in their behavior attitudes. 
 
c) Mutually consistent and reinforcing reforms must be devised 
 
The most challenging effort must be exerted on development of a new economic system. 
First of all, an effective privatization strategy has to be devised in order to produce 
concentrated outside ownership for privatized firms. All privatization models that give an 
upper hand to insiders may be politically opportunistic and thus favorable in the short run, 
but in the long run they result in substantial endogenous corruption that may raise the overall 
level of corruption in the country.  
 
Nations that have already privatized greater part of state controlled assets, should concentrate 
their efforts on developing commercial law that would limit inside-dealing, conflict of 
interest, and protect minority shareholders. But they will also have to raise accounting 
standards, increase transparency of corporate decision-making process, and foster 
competition on the labor market.  
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d) The final success critically depends on the resources and expertise devoted to 
development of a credible and competitive market system 
 
In the long run the only viable policy against endogenous corruption seems to be 
development of the new business elite. Instead of borrowing abroad and investing in 
companies infested with endogenous corruption, the government should invest in human 
capital. It should send bright students to the West, urging them to study particularly 
commercial law, accounting and auditing proficiencies, business administration, industrial 
policy and regulatory practices. Some of them will stay in the West, but many will return, 
and with rising standard of living in native countries, many more will. Returns in real 
economic terms to investment in human capital are the highest, but more than that, a 
prolonged exposure to business practices in counties notorious of honest dealings will have a 
healing effect on endogenous corruption.  
 
VIII. Implementation issues 
 
a) Political acceptability 
 
As we have already seen, battle against corruption is likely to be accepted by the broad strata 
of population. There is a general impression that the previous communist regime was corrupt, 
since its proponents advocated equality and modesty but lived completely different lifestyles 
instead. After the collapse of the Berlin Wall new elites were put in charge all over the 
Central and Eastern Europe. The populace still has high expectations of new regimes, and 
gives legitimacy to its leaders only if they succumb to the social contract in which there is no 
place for corruption. The new governing elite must exploit this positive orientation and build 
a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy. New forms of corruption must be included into this 
program, since different types of corruption tend to support each other. The endogenous 
corruption must have a privileged position in that effort, since it comprise a large section of 
the populace. On the other side of the same token, broad dissemination of endogenous 
corruption means that resistance to the envisaged policy will be substantial. Therefore, public 
relation initiative is essential. All aspects of endogenous corruption must be put in plain 
words, its devastating consequences on the resource allocation examined, and advantages of 
the new liberal regime explained. The fact that the international community places anti 
corruption policy high on its agenda gives a special impetus to policy advocates, as the 




b) Proposed actions and accountability.  
 
In order to coordinate proposed policies a new Task Force has to be formed out of ministries 
involved in the process. The Task Force will ensure a continual flow of information between 
institutions involved. The principal members of the Force will be ministers of economy and 
privatization, finance, foreign trade, and information. It is also important to include 
representatives of the Anti-Monopoly Commission, Stock and Exchange Commission, Anti-
 19 
Corruption Council. The main envisioned activities; accountability of different actors, and 
timing of the process is summarized in the following table (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Accountability and Timing 
Institution Main regulation Preparation  Implementation Follow up 
Ministry of 
Economy 
Start up of new 
firms 
1 month 6 months 6 months 
Ministry of 
Privatization 
Amendments to the 
Privatization Act 
6 months 1 year 4 years 
Ministry of Finance Self-Dealing, 
Investment funds 
3 months 1 year Continual 
Ministry of Foreign 
Trade 
Set of liberalization 
laws 
















Issue & trade in 
securities 
6 months 1 year Continual 
 
 
c) Financial impact  
 
The existing allocation of budgetary resources has to be obeyed in principle. Ministries of 
Privatization, Economy, and Finance, are already equipped in most countries under 
consideration with adequate resources and personnel. Therefore they can accomplish 
additional tasks without additional funding. Foreign Trade Ministry and Anti-Monopoly 
Commission face a challenging burden, since they have to harmonize a bulk of legislation 
with the existing regulation in the European Union, United States, and the World Trade 
Organization. These institutions need additional personnel and funding, which has to be taken 
into account. 
 
d) Evaluation of the policy  
 
It is useful that the Cabinet make at least monthly evaluation of pursued policies. Criteria for 
evaluation have to be prepared in advance, preferably by the Task Force, and accepted at one 
of the first meetings of the Cabinet. The criteria should include at least the following: 
- Survey of the four-firm concentration ratio for different industries 
(share of biggest 4 companies in industry supply); 
- Overall Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), and survey of 
industries having value of HHI greater than 1000; 
- Number and distribution of privatized companies with insider 
majority shareholding; 
- Survey of privatized companies not paying dividends. 
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If the Cabinet rules that after 1 year of policy accomplishment there has been no real progress 
in combat against endogenous corruption, the policy should be reexamined and new 
measures considered for implementation. 
